Economic and Social Development Issues


Military Aid Puts Lives at Risk: Aid Agency Report

A group of aid agencies released a report yesterday giving their perspective on the impact of the military being involved in reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

Report abstract:  As political pressures to “show results” in troop contributing countries intensify, more and more assistance is being channelled through military actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined. Development projects implemented with military money or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and, in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-government elements.

Read the report: Quick Impact Quick Collapse:_The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan


What lessons can President Obama learn from LBJ

As the nation awaits President Obama’s decision about how to proceed with the war in Afghanistan, I found it very helpful to listen to President Lyndon Johnson deliberate with his advisors in 1964 and in the process acknowledge the power politics behind his decision to send thousands into Vietnam.

Bill Moyers Journal presents an hour of President Johnson’s recorded conversations about Vietnam: LBJ’s Path to War: You can watch the videos, download the podcast from the right column or read the transcript.

Bill Moyer’s presentation suggests that President Obama’s deliberations with advisors likely have tragic parallels to those of LBJ and his advisors.  In both cases, the question is raised as to whether thousands of lives will be risked or lost because of one man and his party’s mission to hold on to power. Repeatedly LBJ acknowledges that the US likely has nothing to win in Vietnam but that he has a lot to lose if he is perceived to be weak.

It becomes clear listening to these conversations that reasoned deliberation is not relevant to the debate about next steps in Afghanistan. The power options presented to Obama are: lose now and lose a second term or lose later when you are a second term lame duck President. The continued destruction of Afghanistan and the misery caused for many families is the horrific price of this maneuvering.

Against the force of such power mongering is it any wonder that some see no avenue but to match violence with violence?  In each case the immorality is defended with arguments about the constraints of realpolitik or the imperatives of national pride, or ethnic, religious and cultural identity.

The only way I can see to stop people from waging war to protect their power is to make their power dependent on alternatives.  This means rallying moderates and conservatives and not just liberals against the war.

As President Franklin Roosevelt famously said to pressure groups that wanted him to do good but seemingly politically untenable things – “I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it.”  His point: The reformers need to create the political space for the politician to take advantage of.  This means that we must create the pressure that will allow Obama do the right thing and keep his power.


NYT front page article on the work of the National Solidarity Program

The New York Times cover story today is about the work of the National Solidarity Program (NSP).  While in Afghanistan I spent days filming the impact of NSP in the Kapisa province.  The work of NSP is at the center of the story we are highlighting in Brewing Tea in a Kettle of War.

The article does not fully capture the national impact of the NSP.  Many consider the NSP the most effective economic and social development work in Afghanistan. Since 2003 the NSP has funded 46,000 development projects in 27,000 villages. Elected community councils determine the reconstruction work. Ten percent is paid for by local labor and the average grant is $24,000.   The film will show that supporting this kind of slower, more sustainable long-term and locally led development work may be a more successful path to stability in Afghanistan and western security.

I hope you can take a moment to read this important article and to forward it to friends and colleagues as an example of the positive hard work that Afghans and the Afghan government are doing.

New York Times: An Afghan Development Model: Small is Better

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