Development Issues

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Development, Haiti: Art, an economic stake in the country’s development

Original article found on: Haiti Libre 

11/30/14

 

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As part of the implementation of the Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti (PSDH) developed by the Government, the Council for Economic and Social Development (CDES), an agency of the Primature, recently completed a three-day workshop on the theme “The world of arts and trades through the credit system”, which took place around three fundamental axes: the valuation of arts, trades and occupations according to the various trades; accompanying mechanisms for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the financial system and its adaptation to new economic challenges.

The Office of the Deputy Minister (Marie Carmèle Rose Anne Auguste) responsible for human rights and the fight against extreme poverty is involved in this project together with other government ministries and public agencies.

In her speech, the Minister Auguste highlighted the importance of arts and culture in the development of the country “The arts should be the engine of our economic development. Our culture, the talent of our artists and our craftsmen is our greatest wealth,” appealing to investment in the arts the Minister added “Our artists of sensitive neighborhoods need sustained coaching, good tools to work, adequate environment that enables them to work in peace.”

The Minister Delegate believes essential to build of integration centers in disadvantaged neighborhoods that will be, according to her “places of high culture where will will meet and will will commune all social strata of the Nation.”

At the end of the forum, a series of recommendations was formulated concerning inter alias : the development of a social credit system to finance the activities of artistic creation, the supervision of artists and craftsmen, a strong training in marketing management and customer service and the creation of tens of Community integration Centers, across the country.

 

Original article found on: Haiti Libre 

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Development: It’s Time to Rethink How We Do Development

A group of development experts issues a plea for reform.

BY MATT ANDREWS , LENI WILD , MARTA FORESTI, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

Last month, a group of experts tried to set a different tone. Coming together in a workshop entitled Doing Development Differently, we tried, rather unusually, to focus on what the development community has been doing right — to share stories about projects, policies, and reforms that fostered real change by not doing development in the usual way.

Rather than getting stuck on what doesn’t work, the workshop participants set out to examine recent development successes, and attempted to understand precisely why they worked.

Check out Natalia Adler describing how she worked with a team to promote a “user- centered” approach to public sector reform by giving public servants in Nicaragua a 100 day challenge to experience what it’s like to be on the receiving end of services (by registering a child’s birth or visiting a health clinic, for example). Or take a look at Zac Brisson‘s work on coming to grips with the realities of fiscal behavior in Nigeria (as a prelude to trying to reform this behavior), or at Jaime Faustino‘s presentation about transformational change in the Philippines, achieved through clever work with teams and coalitions to change the status quo on issues like property rights or public health tax.

These and other examples are inspirational. When presented alongside each other, however, they generated more than inspiration. Attendees at the workshop identified a number of core principles that seem to characterize successful development initiatives across very different country contexts and program objectives. The findings highlight that, while development comes in many shapes and sizes, the success stories offer some overarching lessons about how change happens, providing valuable clues to how development support can have the most impact:

First, these initiatives tackle local problems by inviting local people to debate, define, refine and address the issue at hand in an ongoing and iterative process.

Second, they involve agents at all levels (political, managerial, and social), which legitimizes the initiatives by building ownership and momentum into the process. They are “locally owned” in reality, not just on paper.

Third, the initiatives work through local conveners who mobilize all those with a stake in progress (in both formal and informal coalitions and teams) to tackle common problems and introduce relevant change.

Fourth, they blend design and implementation through rapid cycles of planning, action, reflection, and revision (drawing on local knowledge, feedback, and energy) to foster learning from both success and failure.

Fifth, these approaches manage risks by making “small bets,” pursuing activities with promise and dropping others.

And finally, these initiatives foster real solutions to real problems that have real impact, thus building trust, empowering people, and promoting sustainability.

These principles aren’t entirely new, having been central to the “structured flexibility” and “learning process” approaches produced by people like Derek Brinkerhoff and David Hulme in the 1980s and early 1990s. They are found in recent work as well, including the Overseas Development Institute’s Politically Smart, Locally Led work and theProblem-Driven Iterative Adaptation approach currently being adopted in research projects Harvard’s Building State Capability program.

We recognize that many might find the above principles to be common sense. Unfortunately, however, common sense is not always the most common of the senses.Indeed, what is striking is that many development projects, policies, and reforms still do not adhere to such principles. This is true for many initiatives that are externally supported and for many that are driven by developing country governments. We therefore see the need to identify these principles clearly. We also believe it is vital to state our belief that development initiatives will have more impact if these principles are followed.We aim to keep identifying initiatives that follow these principles and to help diffuse their positive impacts more broadly than is currently the case. We will work together as an emerging community of practice and welcome any and all who agree that development can and should be done differently. To start in this direction, our community at the workshop ambitiously decided to capture all this in a statement — the Doing Development Differently manifesto — that reflects the views of those at the workshop, many of whom have signed onto it. It reaffirms commitments for locally led problem solving, for mobilizing multiple stakeholders to take action, for managing risks by taking “small bets” and, above all, maintaining a focus on real results — tangible improvements that have real impact.

Our hope is that this is just the beginning.

Starting small, we want to expand. Limited by time, resources, and our locations, the workshop brought together a group that was necessarily small. But it’s clear that there are people and groups around the world already doing development differently, and their voices deserve to be heard. Practically, our manifesto includes an open invitation to all those who share our principles to join a growing community of practice that can share experiences and strategies adopted in the field of development. As part of this, we made the commitment to host our next convening in a developing country, with much more representation from different regions.

The workshop generated a rich set of cases and examples of doing development differently. They’re now available on the Harvard and ODIwebsites (where you can watch individual talks, or link to related reports). But we’re all too aware that this can look like cherry picking. To overcome such reservations, we aim to launch a dedicated “library” and to crowdsource evidence from around the world on programs that have achieved results (and those that haven’t) based on these principles. We also want to bring in historical experience, too — there’s a long history of at least the past 40 years of attempts to work in this way. This should provide a practical resource for anyone wanting to know more.

We are also dedicated to supporting others. We’ve already begun to work with some of the major donor funders on changing how they do development. We want to support much more peer-to-peer learning, too — connecting Nigerian “small bet” innovators with those who’ve already tried and succeeded (or failed) elsewhere. So watch this space.

It’s time to build on development’s positives, rather than singing an old and sad song about its failure. We are committed to becoming builders, by identifying agents and organizations doing great work, often at the margins and at great risk. Will you join us by signing the manifesto and sharing your experience?

UNICEF/Nicaragua-2013/ Terán

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Development: International Development Is Broken. Here Are Two Ways to Fix It.

Original article found on: New Republic

By Michael Hobbes, Nov 18 2014

 

So I just wrote this essay about all the reasons I think international development, as we currently carry it out, can never achieve its own objectives. One thing I didn’t have room for was the ideas I’m excited about, development projects that meet, at least partially, our outsized expectations of them. Here are two such ideas, and why I think projects like these—technical, slow, un-viral—are the future of development.

Payment by Results

For those of you who’ve never implemented a development project, here’s how it works: You write a proposal to a donor. They agree, in principal, to fund your idea. Then you negotiate what your ‘indicators’ will be. These are the data points the donor will use to determine if you did what you set out to do, whether your project was successful.

Let’s say you’re proposing a project in Zambia, you want to decrease malaria rates. You get the European Commission (EC) to give you $1 million to train Zambian nurses to go house to house handing out malaria treatments, training mothers on symptoms and doses.

You and the EC come up with some indicators they’ll use to evaluate your project after it’s finished: You have to provide 10 training sessions per year, they have to be attended by at least 20 nurses, and all the nurses have make 1,000 home visits within a year of the training.

These sound pretty robust, right? The donor is saying, if we’re gonna give you money, you have to spend it like you told us you would.

But look how each of those indicators is tied to the process, not the outcome. Maybe 20 nurses attended your training, but none of them worked in clinics in high-malaria regions, or they read the newspaper during the training, or they only attended because they wanted the per diems. None of those indicators are related to the thing you actually set out to do.

I’ve done projects in Sub-Saharan Africa where our indicators were the number of Facebook likes we got, how many pages our summary reports were, how many trips to the field we made. Donors send auditors to get the sign-in sheets from our events and copies of PowerPoints we gave.

It’s not just individual projects that fall into the gap between inputs and results. Lant Pritchett’s The Rebirth of Education: Schooling Ain’t Learning documents how the international push for improved school attendance—as opposed to improved literacy, professional skills, and cognitive ability—led to overburdened teachers and crowded schools. According to a 2012 UNECSO study, 130 million kids—about one-quarter of the total worldwide—finished elementary school without basic literacy and math skills. In Nigeria, 52 percent of girls who finished six years of education were still illiterate, a rate that actually increased from 2002, right in the middle of the worldwide push for universal enrollment.

Payment by results does this upside-down: You’re paid for the result. How you get there is up to you.

So if the same project was administered under payment by results—sometimes called pay-for-performance aid or cash-on-delivery aid—you’d do a baseline survey before you started the project. One thousand Zambian kids, let’s say, die of malaria each year in the region where you’re carrying out your project. If, after you’re finished, that number has fallen to 500, you get the $1 million. If it doesn’t, you don’t.

As an employee of an international NGO, someone who spends a lot of time saving, scanning, and filing receipts for coffees in African airports, I love this model. I like that it gives us space to be creative. If we were being judged on our outcome rather than our process, we’d be free to pivot midstream. Maybe the training events aren’t working, and we should meet with nurses during their shifts at the hospitals. Maybe home visits aren’t reaching working mothers, so we should do village-wide weekend events. Because our indicators are related to activities rather than outcome, we couldn’t change our approach if it wasn’t working.

It also gives us the incentive to be cost-effective. If we spend $800,000 on the project and we get the $1 million grant, we can spend the surplus hiring more people, tweeting about our results, doing a fundraising drive. Under the current model, it’s the exact opposite: I have to go to the field, I have to give those training sessions; otherwise, I don’t get reimbursed.

The charity GiveDirectly has gotten a lot of attention lately for simply giving cash to poor people, no questions asked. The idea is that poor Kenyans have the best information on how poor Kenyans should spend their money, and aid agencies and Western donors should just them the means to do so and get out of the way. Payment by results is a step toward applying the same model to development charities themselves.

Not that payment by results is perfect. We could fake those improved death statistics, for one thing. Or we could spend half our budget bribing a politician to increase spending in our district, get our better death rates through graft.

In a survey of the evidence for and against payment by results (spoiler: there isn’t much), the NGO coalition Bond pointed out that this model puts all the financial risk on NGOs, and would encourage them to favor “tested” development projects rather than trying something riskier or more innovative. “One UK NGO,” the report notes, “reported having internal discussions on whether to include disabled children in the target group for an intervention funded through payment by results when their contract would not have paid them the additional cost required.” For me, it’s the untested-ness of payment by results that gives me the greatest trepidation about using it on a large scale. It sounds great, sure, but so did all the other development projects in the unmarked shed behind where they give the TED Talks.

Still, results-faking, profit maximizing, stat-juking, it’s not like those are new risks. Facebook likes aren’t exactly a perfect measure of impact, after all, and I could already be faking my sign-in sheets and my hotel receipts. The reason I don’t has nothing to do with accountability to my donor. It’s because I genuinely want my projects to succeed, not just to look like they do. I’d love it if a donor gave me the freedom to find that out for myself.

The ‘Data Revolution’

A friend of mine works at Amazon.com. Her job is to monitor the activity on the site and make tweaks, down to the millisecond, to maximize how much people buy. Thousands of people at Amazon do the same thing: This is how they know exactly which shade of yellow the “buy” button should be to make you click it. Every time we talk about work, I feel this chasm between how much she knows about her job and how much I know about mine.

Like I say in my essay, we basically have no idea what makes kids in poor countries go to school or not, why their moms vaccinate them or don’t. While Amazon is making tweaks to its business model, we’re reversing ours every time a new study gets published.

Much of the reason for this, boringly, is that we simply do not have very good data on the developing world. Statistics from poor countries are notoriously noisy and imprecise, clouded by political incentives and baseless external projections. In Madagascar, for example, a census hasn’t been carried out since 1993. The 2006 Nigerian census was mired in controversy, politicians accused of inflating numbers to increase political, ethnic and religious representation for their districts. “We do not really know our population,” the chairman of the country’s National Population Commission said at the time.

Morten Jerven’s book Poor Numbers (wonks only please) notes that many of the economic statistics you read from Sub-Saharan Africa—GDP, prices, income levels—are bold extrapolations from meager data points. The UN has price figures, for example, for 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, covering 1991 to 2004. But less than half of 1,410 observations have actual data behind them. The rest are projections, assumptions, a finger in the wind. For 15 of the countries, the UN has never received any data at all. This is how Guinea is either the seventh poorest country in Africa (out of 45) or the eleventh richest, depending on which source you’re using. Jerven compares the three main rankings of per capita GDP and sees Liberia jump 20 places.

Here’s the World Bank’s chief economist for Middle East and North Africa in 2011, calling Africa a ‘statistical tragedy’:

Today, only 35 percent of Africa’s population lives in countries that use the 1993 UN System of National Accounts; the others use earlier systems, some dating back to the 1960s. … Consider the case of Ghana, which decided to update its GDP last year to the 1993 system. When they did so, they found that their GDP was 62 percent higher than previously thought. Ghana’s per capita GDP is now over $1,000, making it a middle-income country.

Nigeria did the same thing in 2013, rebased its economic statistics, and saw its GDP jump up by 89 percent. These are the statistics development projects are based on, what they are trying to change. It’s like trying to lose 20 pounds without a mirror and stepping onto a different scale every day.

This is where “the data revolution” comes in. Amanda Glassman, a member of the Data for Africa Working Group, notes that most of the development statistics—how many people can read, who is at risk of starvation—come from household surveys, many of which are carried out by international monitoring and evaluation teams checking to see whether NGOs are spending donor money wisely (there’s those indicators again).

The problem with these surveys is that they’re not aligned between donors. So the Gates foundation team comes to a village, asks everybody their age and their weight and what they’ve been vaccinated for. Next month, Oxfam comes and asks them their height and their education level and how well they can read. The next month the World Bank comes and … you get the idea.

Meanwhile, the clinics and schools and local statistics offices, the bodies that are actually mandated to gather this kind of information, are cut out of the process. They don’t have the staff or budgets to carry out their own investigations, and none of the donors report their findings back. If Bill Gates or the World Bank or whoever finds high rates of TB, they’re not obligated to give this information to the agencies responsible for addressing it. The official line is basically “we’ll take it from here, guys.”

This is understandable in the short-term. Local agencies don’t have the staff to solve large-scale problems, and they might be undertrained, corrupt, or flapping in the political winds. In this Development Drums podcast, the interviewees mention that statistics offices get calls from politicians, ordering them to make the numbers look like they’re improving.

But in the medium- and long-term, it means that African authorities stay under-resourced, de-capacitated, out of the loop. Replacement of local authorities by international NGOs might even be partly responsible for Liberia and Sierra Leone’s slow response to the Ebola outbreak: After decades of being bypassed by international health charities, local public health services didn’t know about, and weren’t able to respond to, conditions in their own country. When international foundations come in with their own statistical programs and skip the local authorities, the locals are cut out of information about their own countries.

But now we know about this problem! Since Jerven’s book, the dearth of development data has gone from obscure and insoluble to urgent and achievable. The Data for Africa Working Group report identifies efforts by the Gates Foundation, USAID, Rockefeller Foundation, UN, and World Bank to improve statistical agencies all over Africa.

Like the last idea, this one also warrants some skepticism. This is not the first time rich countries have sent experts to poor countries with the aim of improving their institutions. Technical assistance, as they call it in development lingo, has been found to be one of the least effective forms of aid.

But the potential of a more unified approach to gathering data is profound. Statistics are how development agencies diagnose problems and identify effective solutions. “Big data” gets overhyped these days, and real-time data collection in rural areas sounds like exactly the kind of development gimmick that will become the next One Laptop Per Child. But when it comes to the basic numbers—population, economics, living conditions, many parts of Africa would benefit from any improvement at all.

Neither of these ideas is all that sexy, they’re not going to get shared on UpWorthy or make you reach into your pocket for your PayPal password or whatever. They’re methodological, technical, there’s no fancy new technology or smiling celebrity at their prow. We’re not talking game-changers here, more like game-slightly-tweakers.

But the more I look at development, the more I think the age of the game-changer is over. Sixty percent of the world’s poor live in middle-income countries; only 14 percent of them are in fragile of conflict-prone ones. The countries still getting aid are getting less and less of it. Charles Kenny, who wrote an entire book about how much better the developing world is now than it used to be, points out that in the 1990s, 40 percent of aid-receiving countries relied on donations for more than one-tenth of their budgets. Now, that’s below 30 percent, and dropping.

Not that we should ignore the Afghanistans and Burundis of the world, but by 2030, up to 41 countries are going to move into the middle-income bracket. Increasingly, their challenge, as ours, will be the distribution of resources, not the creation of them. The development technologies of the future aren’t going to be boreholes and school buildings. They’re going to be labor inspectors, census bureaus, government administrators, state pensions: All the boring stuff that makes our own countries function.

So yeah, that’s why I like these ideas. One of them says, either help us or go home. The other says, if you’re going to be here, know the problem and whether what you’re doing is solving it.

In 1998, Amartya Sen won a Nobel Prize, in part, for showing that a famine had never occurred in a functioning democracy. It’s never that there isn’t enough food to go around; it’s that authoritarian governments don’t set up the mechanisms to provide it, at a decent price, where it’s needed.

The more I learn about development, the more I think the same principle applies to prosperity itself.

 

Original article found on: New Republic

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Afghanistan, Development: Pentagon’s Economic Development in Afghanistan ‘Accomplished Nothing’

Defence News, Nov. 18, 2014 – 03:45AM   |  By JOE GOULD   |

An Afghan construction worker makes concrete tubes on the outskirts of Kabul. A U.S. inspector general is investigating Pentagon reconstruction efforts in the country. (WAKIL KOHSAR/ / Agence France-Presse)

WASHINGTON — The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) says he is investigating the Pentagon’s efforts to spark that country’s economic development, which cost between $700 million and $800 million and “accomplished nothing.”

SIGAR’s chief, John Sopko, told reporters Tuesday, that the agency has opened an “in-depth review” into the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), a Defense Department unit aimed at developing war zone mining, industrial development and fostering private investments.

“We have gotten serious allegations about the management and mismanagement of that agency, as well as a policy question about what they were doing and whether they should have existed,” Sopko said.

More broadly, Sopko faulted the US government’s economic development efforts in Afghanistan as “an abysmal failure,” saying it lacked a single leader, a clear strategy or accountability. An avenue of inquiry for SIGAR’s investigation into TFBSO could be Afghanistan’s underdeveloped mining industry.

“We have seen hit-and-miss efforts to develop the [Afghan] economy,” Sopko said of the US. “You, the development experts, should have had a plan to develop the economy and you haven’t, so now we’re stuck.”

Untapped mineral wealth in Afghanistan is estimated at $1 trillion, but Sopko noted that Afghanistan has only recently passed mineral laws and legal gaps make investment unattractive. Critics say the law lacks transparency regarding contracts and ownership, and strong rules for open and fair bidding.

The task force did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Sopko has said the US’ unprecedented $120 billion reconstruction investment there is at risk because Afghanistan is rife with corruption and lacks the security, technical prowess and economic health to sustain much of the work the US has done. He cited the case of $486 million the Defense Department spent for 20 G222 transport planes intended for the Afghan Air Force that sat idle in Kabul before they were sold for $32,000 and scrapped.

While the perception on Capitol Hill is that the US commitment is over, Sopko said, it has promised a decade of funding in its bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan.

“We need to make a commitment there because they can’t afford the government we’ve given them, and if our intended goal was a government that would keep or kick the terrorists out, we’re going to have to fund it,” Sopko said.

Afghanistan’s domestic revenues do not cover its total public expenditures, 90 percent of which are funded by the US and international partners, according to a report last year from another government watchdog, the Government Accountability Office.

Corruption continues to feed the insurgency and drain the economy, Sopko said, but Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s focus on anti-corruption and regaining money from the 2010 Kabul Bank failure are positive signs. Sopko was optimistic for freedom of movement and better security within 10 years.

“It is better, but the question I’m asking is, ‘Could it have been better,’” he said. “This is the most money we have spent on reconstruction of a single country in the history of our republic. Shouldn’t it have been better?” ■

Email: jgould@defensenews.com.

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Afghanistan, Development: The West Made Lots of Promises to Afghan Girls, Now It’s Breaking Them

Original article found on: The Daily Beast

By Heather Barr, 10/20/14

One reason given for the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was to educate girls. But as the Western military shrinks there, so does the funding for those schools.

Shah Marai/AFP/Getty

Shah Marai/AFP/Getty

KABUL, Afghanistan — The girls of Afghanistan have been betrayed. When Taliban rule ended almost 13 years ago, international donors rushed in to promise that young women would no longer be denied an education. Western governments spent a decade patting themselves on the back for what they touted as exceptional work supporting schools for the beleaguered girls of Afghanistan. They talked about bringing women out of purdah, literally as well as figuratively, so they could help their families and their country to prosper.

But the closing of one school after another exposes the hollowness of those promises. In fact, the state of education in Afghanistan is still so shaky that only about half of Afghan girls manage to go to school, and those numbers are set to decline.

In the volatile southern province of Kandahar, for instance, an innovative school for teenage girls will soon close its doors. The Kandahar Institute for Modern Studies, established in 2006 with funding and encouragement from the Canadian government, has run out of donors. And it is only one of a number of Afghan schools to face the budget axe swung by distant governments and cost-cutting politicians.

Other schools have been shuttered because of attacks and threats stemming from the war that continues to engulf the country. In July, girls’ schools closed in one entire district, depriving 40,000 girls of education.

The website of the U.S. development agency proudly proclaims, “In 2013, one million Afghan learners are enrolled in schools with USAID assistance, and over 5 million primary grade students benefitted from USAID assistance.” But in January 2014, the U.S. Congress cut the U.S. government’s allocation of development aid for Afghanistan by half.

Then there’s the United Kingdom. “We agree that expanded access to good quality secondary education that produces skills for employment is essential for Afghanistan’s future prosperity,” the British government wrote in 2013. Yet in a 2012 report the U.K. government had already decided that it had “built too much” in terms of schools and health clinics in Afghanistan and that only “critical” facilities would remain open.

“The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women,” said Laura Bush, wife of then-U.S. President George W. Bush.
Getting Afghan girls into school wasn’t just a benign-but-unintended by-product of the international military intervention in Afghanistan. Soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. and the invasion of Afghanistan, world leaders explicitly cited the extreme oppression suffered by women and girls under the Taliban as a justification for the operation.

“The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women,” said Laura Bush, wife of then-U.S. President George W. Bush, in November 2001, giving the weekly presidential radio address in place of her husband.

“The women of Afghanistan still have a spirit that belies their unfair, downtrodden image,” said Cherie Blair, wife of then-U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, also in November 2001. “We need to help them free that spirit and give them their voice back, so they can create the better Afghanistan we all want to see.”

But today, as crises in Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and West Africa compete for attention, Afghanistan is not even yesterday’s news—it’s last year’s news. Journalists are leaving Kabul, embassies are downsizing, and donors are quietly and drastically scaling back.

“How’s it going?” I asked a friend who runs aid programs at the U.S. embassy in Kabul not long ago.

“Oh, you know,” he said. “Just shutting things down.”

Military disengagement from Afghanistan is advancing; the newly signed Bilateral Security Agreement with the U.S. and Status of Forces Agreement with NATO pave the way for a continued, but very limited, international military involvement in Afghanistan.

Donor involvement is more important than ever, however. President Hamid Karzai handed over to Afghanistan’s new president, Ashraf Ghani, not just the reins of power but also a badly overdrawn checking account. Ghani’s government has been forced to seek a $537 million bailout from donors just to continue paying civil servant salaries. There are hopes that this new government, fronted by Ghani, a technocrat who was formerly Afghanistan’s finance minister and spent several decades with the World Bank, will bring much-needed fiscal stability to the Afghan economy. But that won’t happen tomorrow.

Afghanistan will have to pay for its own schools one day, and one hopes it is moving in that direction. But it can’t possibly do so right now. The ones who will pay first and worst are the country’s girls as they slide back toward the devastation of illiteracy.

A November donor conference in London will bring together all of Afghanistan’s donors to take stock of commitments made at the 2012 Tokyo Conference and to craft a new partnership going forward. Donors should come to the conference mindful not just of commitments they have made to the Afghan government, but also the solemn pledges they first made to support Afghan women and girls in 2001, and have made over and over since then.

Earlier this month, after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two children’s rights activists, Malala Yousafzai and Kailash Satyarthi, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Yousafzai, a 17-year old from Pakistan, would be travelling to Canada to accept honorary Canadian citizenship, an honor only five others, including Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama, have ever received. U.S. President Barack Obama was quick to congratulate the Nobel winners as well, saying, “As we celebrate their achievements, we must recommit ourselves to the world that they seek—one in which our daughters have the right and opportunity to get an education; and in which all children are treated equally.”

That’s what Afghan girls want. And that’s what the countries that marched into Afghanistan 13 years ago promised them. This is no time to break that promise.

Original article found on: The Daily Beast

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